form of expression, a body language for people who otherwise might not be able to speak or even to admit what they feel" (7) and as "a cultural symptom of anxiety and stress" arising from conflicts that are "genuine and universal" (9) is accurate enough as far as it goes. From a psychoanalytic point of view, however, it does not go far enough.
Although she does not appear to share Juliet Mitchell's (2000) insight that "there is violence as well as sexuality in the seductions and rages of the hysteric" (x), Showalter does call attention to the centrality of externalization (i.e., projection) in these conditions. She writes: "Contemporary hysterical patients blame external sources-a virus, sexual molestation, chemical warfare, satanic conspiracy, alien infiltration-for psychic problems" (1997, 4) . In recognizing the paranoid element in hysteria, albeit without theorizing the connection, Showalter contributes to the evolution of a deeper understanding. In the following, we will fasten upon this externalizing feature and offer a psychoanalytic-more particularly, a modern Kleinian-understanding of hysteria (including so-called multiple chemical sensitivity, environmental illness, and fibromyalgia syndrome) as subtypes of a more general hysteroparanoid syndrome.
Whereas traditional psychoanalytic accounts have emphasized the role of oedipal and preoedipal sexual wishes and conflicts in hysteria, seldom associating it with aggression and paranoia, we will argue that such overlooked psychological factors as unconscious aggression, envy, hostility, malice, destructiveness, and the resulting persecutory "guilt" and need for punishment occupy a central place in both the old and the new hysterias.
1 Following a previously articulated (Carveth 2001 ) conception of the unconscious need for punishment as a defensive evasion of unbearable conscious guilt, rather than (as in Freud's view) its equivalent, we view hysterical, psychosomatic, depressive, masochistic, and other self-tormenting conditions as defensive alternatives to facing and bearing conscious guilt.
Although our analysis has much in common with both Showalter's Hystories and Edward Shorter's From Paralysis to Fatigue (1992) , we at the same time seek to correct their occasional blurring of the important distinction between hyste-ria and psychosomatic conditions and their use of the term "somatization" in the description of both. Showalter, for example, even while correctly noting that "on the whole, Freudians make strict distinctions between hysterical symptoms and psychosomatic symptoms" (1997, 44) , refers to "psychosomatic conversion symptoms" (36). She muddies the waters further by describing the conversion symptom as a particular form of "symbolic somatization" (44). But psychosomatic symptoms result from a process of somatization in which psychological and emotional forces contribute to the development of genuine organic disease and in which symbolization, if it is operative at all (and we believe it often is), takes a somewhat different form from that in conversion. Showalter makes no secret of her difficulty with these concepts: "How psychiatrists tell the difference between hysterical and psychosomatic symptoms is hard for a layman to figure out" (44). But in many instances it isn't hard at all. Psychosomatic symptoms are symptoms of objective medical disease: organic tissue pathology is evident. Such disease is thought to result from the somatization of psychological and emotional forces affecting the immune system and operating in conjunction with various organic and constitutional predispositions. By contrast, hysterical symptoms involve no objective organic pathology but entail mimesis: the unconscious mimicry of organic disease and dysfunction, as distinct from their conscious imitation as in malingering.
Whereas many writers on psychosomatic disease see it as entailing the failure or foreclosure of symbolization, we believe a symbolization process may yet be at work in it, as the following case vignette suggests.
Case 1: Mr. A
Mr. A had been suffering for some years from an objectively observable, painfully tormenting rash covering much of his body surface. It had proved resistant to a myriad of medical treatments. Recently, in addition, he had been experiencing frequent "accidents," a few of which had been life-threatening. It turned out that for years, as the eldest son of a large family, he had been saddled with the sole responsibility for looking after his aging parents, his chronically depressed mother and his bitter, manipulative, narcissistic father. His own business was suffering due to his need to make frequent trips to another country to attend to their real and imagined needs. His siblings, in the meantime, were leading their own lives and quite content to have the patient free them from their own responsibilities vis-à-vis the parents. When asked in the first session whether he ever felt angry over this state of affairs, Mr. A looked curious and reported that his friends had sometimes asked him the same thing. Over the next few sessions Mr. A proceeded to become angrier and angrier, and as he did so his rash began to diminish. He had been raised within a particularly concrete and magical version of Christianity. The rash, it turned out, had made him feel he was "burning in hell" in punishment for his hitherto unconscious death wishes toward his parents and the siblings who saddled him with the responsibility for looking after them. As his rage and death wishes became conscious and began to subside as he started to take constructive action to end his masochistic submission to exploitation, the rash gradually disappeared. But because Mr. A was unable to experience and bear conscious guilt, his rash was quickly replaced by other forms of self-sabotage and selfpunishment.
* * *
As a result of clinical experiences of this sort, we are not at all convinced that the difference between conversion and somatization boils down to the presence of symbolism in the former and its absence in the latter, though it is possible that different types or levels of symbolization may be involved in the two conditions. Showalter (1997) quotes Mark Micale, who writes that "hysteria is 'not a disease; rather it is an alternative, physical, verbal, and gestural language, an iconic social communication'" (7). Psychosomatic illness is disease-but it, too, appears, at least sometimes, to involve interpretable unconscious meaning.
According to Mitchell, "hysteria's many manifestations have shown some striking similarities throughout the agessensations of suffocation, choking, breathing and eating difficulties, mimetic imitations, deceitfulness, shock, fits, death states, wanting (craving, longing)" (2000, 13) . Under the category of mimetic imitations falls the hysterical utilization of the body in the simulation of organically based disease and somatic dysfunction. In the theatrics of "conversion," physical illness is dramatically mimicked-once again, unconsciously, not consciously as in malingering-and somatic dysfunction (difficulty swallowing, paralysis, contractions, nonorganic limp, paraplegia, etc.) lacking any discoverable organic basis is displayed. The type of hysteria known as hypochondria involves subjective suffering and the conviction that one is medically ill in the absence of objective evidence of disease or injury.
Psychosomatic illness involves somatization as distinct from conversion or mimetic imitation. In somatization, manifest psychological distress of various sorts (such as Mr. A's rage, death wishes, and consequent need for punishment) is found by the subject to be unbearable and consequently is foreclosed and somehow channelled into the body, resulting in real organic disease (such as his objectively observable burning rash) that functions as a self-punitive and persecutory alternative to unbearable conscious guilt. The foreclosure of conscious distress does not always, we would argue, entail a foreclosure of symbolization. The pain arising from his organic rash symbolized to Mr. A that he was "burning in hell" for his sins, his failure to "honor" mother and father and his Cain-like murderous rage toward his siblings. Although all disease involves psychological factors to some degree, what distinguishes psychosomatic disease is precisely the prominence of psychological factors in its aetiology.
Joyce McDougall employs the title Theaters of the Body (1989) for a book dealing primarily with psychosomatic disease rather than hysteria. But there is no doubt that theatrics are more obvious in the drama of hysterical conversion than in the often obscure somatization processes underlying psychosomatic disease. This is in no way to imply the absence of symbolization in what McDougall views as the "archaic hyste-ria" of psychosomatic disease as distinct from the theatrical "neurotic hysteria" (54) in which it is so obvious. The point is only to suggest that the symbolization entailed in somatization (as distinct from conversion) may take the archaic form that Hanna Segal (1957) describes as a "symbolic equation" as contrasted with the more elaborated symbolization processes entailed in "symbolic representation." Far from seeing meaning in hysteria and only a foreclosure of meaning in psychosomatic disease, we believe that in both conditions, whatever additional factors may be in play, unconscious aggression and an unconscious need to suffer serve as alternatives to and defenses against unbearable guilt. But whereas the mimicry and theatrics of hysteria embody an hystero-paranoid defense against and substitute for the experience of unbearable guilt, in psychosomatic conditions the need to suffer finds an all-tooreal and concrete outlet in the development of organic disease and its attendant discomfort, pain, and torment.
Both classical Freudian and post-Freudian psychoanalysis have emphasized the role in hysteria of such factors as forbidden sexual wishes, unresolved oedipal conflicts, castration anxiety, the need for attachment, and the compulsion to preserve object ties or a threatened sense of self. In so doing, they have tended to lose sight of the role of aggression and guilt-just as in various branches of contemporary psychoanalytic thought the dynamics of the superego have been lost sight of.
2 It is not our intent to deny the role of sexuality, attachment, object relations, or issues of identity and the self, but merely to refocus attention on factors that we regard as central but, for a variety of reasons, have widely succumbed to what Russell Jacoby (1975) has referred to as the "social amnesia" in which "society remembers less and less faster and faster" and in which "the sign of the times is thought that has succumbed to fashion" (1). Even while "listening with the third ear" (Reik 1948) to the latent meanings, messages, motives, and dynamics underlying manifest symptoms and experience, Freud was so centered on sexuality in hysteria that he tended to overlook or downplay the role of aggression in this condition. Although in his final dual instinct theory Freud (1920) eventually made aggression as fundamental as sexuality in his metapsychology, he never reworked his psychology of hysteria in this light. Mitchell (2000) has recently argued that another reason for the neglect of the role of aggression (and, hence, of guilt) in hysteria has to do with Freud's and subsequent psychoanalysts' relative retreat from Charcot's and Freud's own earlier recognition of the fact of male hysteria. This led psychoanalysts to collude with the wider cultural equation of hysteria with femininity. Although hysteria could be acknowledged in the "effeminate" male homosexual, gross instances of hysteria in heterosexual men were redefined as "shell shock," "battle fatigue," etc., while the everyday instances of male hysteriadizzy spells, fainting (such as Freud's famous faints in Jung's presence), organically ungrounded orthopaedic dysfunctions, and such psychosomatic phenomena as sensitive breasts and swollen tummies in men whose wives are pregnant, etc.-are somehow overlooked or discounted.
Listening with the third ear does not guarantee recognition of the aggression underlying manifest suffering, but without this distinctively psychoanalytic capacity there is simply no way it will be detected. As a consequence of this failure, the objects of such suffering remain unempowered by the discovery of their unconscious subjectivity. For far from being simple victims or martyrs of mysterious afflictions, in reality they are unconscious sadomasochistic agents tormenting themselves for understandable reasons.
In Todd Haynes's film, Safe (1995), Carol White (Julianne Moore) is an affluent but bored suburban housewife who appears, at the outset, to be suffering from a personality disorder of a schizoid type characterized by identity diffusion, anhedonia, diffuse anxiety, and a depressed feeling of emptiness. Obsessively preoccupied with maintaining and enhancing her spacious, tastefully furnished and decorated home, she seems otherwise unoccupied and lost. She seems curiously detached from both sexuality and aggression. Her stepson's vivid (albeit politically incorrect) essay on gang violence offends her; she asks, "Why does it have to be so 'gory'?" In another scene the camera plays over Carol's blank and emo-tionally detached face as her husband performs intercourse (one cannot call this making love); she pats his back distractedly as he reaches orgasm.
Gradually, in addition to her vague anxiety, joylessness, and detachment, Carol begins to develop a range of mysterious physical symptoms (nosebleeds, coughing fits, difficulty breathing, etc.) for which, after extensive investigation, her doctor is unable to find any physical basis. He refers her for psychiatric treatment, despite her suppressed yet evident hostility and bland resistance to the idea that psychological factors might be at the root of "symptoms" that by now have led her to withdraw entirely from sexual involvement with her husband. As frustrating as he finds this situation, her husband struggles, not entirely successfully, to suppress his irritation. Despite his father's strictures, Carol's stepson still manifests his anger toward her; socialization into the family culture of politeness and nonaggression has apparently not yet fully taken hold of him.
Encouraged by the suggestions of a friend and a flier found in a health food store from an "alternative health care" organization that she later contacts, Carol comes increasingly to attribute her problems to an environment that she believes contains toxins to which she is chemically sensitive. We witness the worsening of her "environmental illness" (EI) or "multiple chemical sensitivity" (MCS) as she retreats from her home and family to a supposedly chemically "safe" environment provided by this group in the rural southwest; and then, when this proves insufficient, to a specially engineered, igloo-like habitation designed to provide even more effective protection against a world to which she seems increasingly allergic.
Throughout most of this film the director maintains a neutral attitude as to whether Carol's affliction is chemically based, as she insists, or hysterical or psychosomatic, as her physicians seem to think. But towards the end there is a group encounter session at the retreat led by its resident guru in which, one by one, her fellow patients painfully acknowledge that their EI had arisen as a kind of unconsciously self-punitive alternative to consciously facing guilt and making reparation for their hitherto unacknowledged hatred, bitterness, longings for revenge, and inability to forgive others and themselves. Carol listens distractedly but appears unmoved by these revela-tions. Her "illness" intensifies. At the end of the film we see her recoil anxiously from her visiting husband's parting embrace, apparently a "reaction" to the cologne he was wearing, as he and her stepson prepare to fly home. With what appears to be an oddly contented look on her face, she heads back to her isolated and hermetically sealed capsule.
One of the aspects of the film most interesting to the clinician concerns the way that Peter Dunning, the resident guru/therapist, is depicted. Initially at least, he and his organization appear to advocate the idea that "environmental illness" is a genuine medical condition caused by toxins that official medicine has so far failed to identify. But over time we detect a subtle shift in the messages he communicates to his "patients": he increasingly suggests that their suffering is a consequence less of toxic chemicals than of toxic emotions.
Although Dunning's directions to "think positive" and replace hatred with love have a distinctly "New Age" flavor and strike the psychoanalytically informed viewer as naive, the overall therapeutic strategy of his retreat could be viewed as ingenious. Instead of directly confronting the patient with the hysterical and paranoid nature of his or her disorder, he adopts what followers of Hyman Spotnitz's (1969; 1976 ) "modern psychoanalysis" refer to as the techniques of "mirroring" and "joining." He "mirrors" their condition himself: he too suffers from an immune deficiency disease. And instead of attacking the resistance to awareness of the emotional causes of their suffering, he "joins" this resistance and gives the appearance, initially at least, of sharing their understanding of it as caused by a toxic environment. (Much later he will insist that sufferers from EI have made themselves sick by attacking their own immune systems, thus making themselves vulnerable to environmental factors.)
Like many psychoanalysts who work with highly resistant, personality disordered, and psychotic individuals, Dunning has the clinical wisdom not to attempt, at the outset and perhaps for a very long time, to differ with or challenge the preferred self-understanding of his patients. But unlike those therapists who never move beyond empathy and the validation of experience and who therefore collude with the very pathology they should be treating, Dunning, like Spotnitz and his followers, eventually comes out of the therapeutic closet, as it were, and invites his patients to face the much resisted emotional basis of their afflictions, which he rightly regards as rooted in the dynamics of unconscious self-attack.
We don't know what becomes of Carol. Perhaps she eventually becomes willing to set aside her paranoid evasion of responsibility and to call herself into question. But this is doubtful, for she seems more than "half in love with easeful death." But what are the sins, real or imagined, for which she has judged herself deserving of self-execution? Whereas the hatred poisoning the psyche of Nell, one of the other patients in the group, is "hot" and therefore unmistakable, Carol's is cool and easily masked by her apparent meekness and suffering. Being only eleven and, in the great tradition of preadolescents, as yet largely uncivilized, her stepson Rory sees it-and hates her back.
Central to Showalter's (1997) argument is the observation that the hysteria investigated by Breuer and Freud was not the isolated product of a certain historical period. Rather, the same "illness" has mutated into contemporary forms corresponding to changes in the cultural context. Thus, the latetwentieth-century syndromes she describes (chronic fatigue syndrome [CFS] ; multiple personality disorder [MPD] ; satanic ritual abuse [SRA] ; alien abduction [AA]; Gulf War syndrome [GWS] ) are modern forms of the hysteria once diagnosed in upper-class Victorian women; and they are "psychological epidemics" (1). To Showalter's list of new hysterias, we would add: Carol White's multiple chemical sensitivity (MCS) or environmental illness (EI); fibromyalgia syndrome (FMS); as well as current popular concerns with intestinal toxins, parasitic infestation (ITPIS), and colonic cleansing. (In some of these instances the acronyms are our invention. We believe it makes sense to classify all of the above as subtypes of a more general hystero-paranoid syndrome [HPS] .
3 ) Showalter defines hystories as "the cultural narratives of hysteria" (1997, 5) . In no way is she accusing patients of merely fabricating, pretending, seeking attention, or malingering. Nor is she stating categorically that there is no organic basis for the perceived symptoms, although, as she points out, none of the hundreds of studies investigating these claims has produced any conclusive evidence. Despite this absence of scientific support, sufferers aggressively maintain an unyielding conviction that their symptoms are organically based. 4 In Hysteria: The Elusive Neurosis (1978), Alan Krohn writes: "It should be stressed that hysterics are not faking, playing games, or simply seeking attention. . . . The hysteric is neither a malingerer nor a psychopath in that the sorts of parts he plays, feelings he experiences, and actions he undertakes have predominantly unconscious roots-he is usually not aware of trying to fool or deceive" (162). Yet, as Krohn observes, such illusions may display certain standards of conventionality and reality-testing: "The facility with which the hysteric can utilize roles considered acceptable by his culture attests to his sensitivity to the norms of the culture, the limits of acceptability, interpersonal resourcefulness-in short, his capacity for good reality testing, impulse control, and interpersonal sensitivity" (161-62).
It is a hallmark of those suffering from the newer forms of hysteria to insist on the existence of objective (as distinct from subjective or psychological and emotional) causes of their perceived symptoms: viruses (as yet neither isolated nor identified by medical researchers); toxin-producing fecal matter impacted in the bowels; radiation emitted by video display terminals; molds growing on or in the walls of houses; longrepressed memories of satanic ritual abuse; abduction by aliens; etc. Indeed, thousands of people in North America and Western Europe are presenting with long lists of seemingly inexplicable and unrelated symptoms: extreme fatigue, sore muscles, swollen glands, headaches, stomach troubles, rashes, memory dysfunction, depression. So vehement are the convictions of many of these patients that their conditions have objective rather than subjective origins that Showalter has been roundly attacked for suggesting that psychological and sociocultural factors might be involved. Similarly, with respect to so-called "fibromyalgia syndrome" (FMS), neurologist Thomas Bohr, who with psychiatrist Arthur Barsky "contends that even honouring this bundle of symptoms with a medical label may be doing more to make people sick than to cure them" (Groopman 2000, 86) , "has received more than two hundred pieces of hate mail, and has been lambasted by fibromyalgia advocates on the Internet and in newsletters" (91)-despite the fact that "these doctors don't claim that the symptoms of fibromyalgia are not real, only that their origin lies in the mind and not in the peripheral nerves of the body" (86). Showalter remarks that the ferocity of these reactions "has only confirmed my analysis of hysterical epidemics of denial, projection, accusation, and blame" (x).
Nevertheless, challenging American Medical Association position papers, some physicians lend support to the objectifying claims of these patients, maintaining that they are suffering from genuine illnesses to which names such as "chronic fatigue syndrome," "fibromyalgia syndrome," and "multiple chemical sensitivity" have been appended. It is for this reason, Showalter asserts, that the proliferation of these conditions depends both on the media "narratives" that do so much to generate them (hence the "stories" of "hystories") and on the collusion of physicians, researchers, and psychotherapists who either take at face value the patient claims with which they are presented or, in some cases, operating from their own therapeutic agendas, actually help manufacture the maladies in question through processes of subtle and not so subtle suggestion and interpersonal influence (17) (18) 122) . In this connection it is significant that the rheumatologist who first codified the socalled fibromyalgia syndrome, Frederick Wolfe, now wishes he could make this diagnosis disappear:
"For a moment in time, we thought we had discovered a new physical disease," he said. "But it was the emperor's new clothes. When we started out, in the eighties, we saw patients going from doctor to doctor with pain. We believed that by telling them they had fibromyalgia we reduced stress and reduced medical utilization. This idea, a great, humane idea that we can interpret their distress as fibromyalgia and help them-it didn't turn out that way. My view now is that we are creating an illness rather than curing one." (Groopman 2000, 87) The fact that hysterical symptoms as they are presented "have internal similarities or evolve in similar directions as they're retold" (Showalter 1997, 6) does not necessitate the conclusion that an objective event or organic disorder underlies them: "Patients learn about diseases from the media, unconsciously develop the symptoms, and then attract media attention in an endless cycle. The human imagination is not infinite, and we are all bombarded by these plot lines every day. Inevitably, we all live out the social stories of our time." Showalter's literary training also serves her well in her analysis of the similarities that believers find so compelling: Literary critics . . . realize that similarities between two stories do not mean that they mirror a common reality or even that the writers have read each other's texts. Like all narratives, hystories have their own conventions, stereotypes, and structures. Writers inherit common themes, structures, characters, and images. . . . We need not assume that patients are either describing an organic disorder or else lying when they present similar narratives of symptoms. (6) As Showalter observes: "A century after Freud, many people still reject psychological explanations for symptoms; they believe psychosomatic [and hysterical or somatoform] disorders are illegitimate and search for physical evidence that firmly places cause and cure outside the self" (4). The validity of Showalter's observation is borne out by the vociferous insistence of hysterical patients themselves, who demand that their symptoms, however indefinite and variable, be acknowledged as genuine, organically based conditions. For example, rejecting any suggestion that psychological factors might be involved in her suffering and insisting on the medical objectivity of so-called fibromyalgia syndrome, one patient told Groopman: "I won't see any doctor who questions the legitimacy of what I have" (2000, 87). Showalter remarks that such patients "live in a culture that still looks down on psychogenic illness, that does not recognize or respect its reality. The selfesteem of the patient depends on having the physiological nature of the illness accepted" (1997, 117) . It would seem that this disrespect for psychogenic illness is shared by those physicians (including some psychiatrists) who, despite the lack of supporting scientific evidence, nevertheless seek to validate such externalizing claims. Insofar as large segments of psychiatry itself forego psychology for biology, psychodynamics for neurochemistry, it might itself be seen as hysterical and resistant to psychoanalysis.
In order to meet the objective of plausibly establishing "cause and cure outside the self," patients must work within the parameters that the culture will allow, for all cultures maintain their own "legitimate symptom pool [s] ," and it is a hallmark of hysteria to "mimic culturally permissible forms of distress" (Showalter 1997, 15) . This tendency of hysteria to remain within certain bounds of convention was also described by Krohn: "Hysteria makes use of dominant myths, assumptions, and identities of the culture in which it appears. The hysteric may play out a somewhat caricatured version of an accepted role in an effort to enlist caring, attention, help, or to satisfy other needs; however, he rarely goes far enough to be considered substantially deviant . . . the hysteric characteristically forms his sense of himself around an identity granted a high degree of approval in the culture" (1978, 160) .
Thus, while symptoms change, and contemporary symptoms are, naturally, congruent with current cultural concerns and preoccupations, the function of the "symptoms" is the same as it was in the nineteenth century: to manifest an allegedly physical condition "that firmly places cause and cure outside the self" or, more precisely, that solidly places cause and cure within the body but outside the self, thereby expressing pain and conflict in "acceptable" forms of bodily illness without the taint of psychological forces at work (Showalter 1997, 4) . This differentiation between conditions that are in the body but not of the self is an important one. The adaptive character of hysteria is also described by Shorter, who writes that "hysteria offers a classic example of patients who present symptoms as the culture expects them, or, better put, as the doctors expect them" (1992, (8) (9) .
But to explain this flight from psychology simply in terms of the cultural stigmatization of illness recognized as psychogenic is to overlook the deeper reasons for this very stigmatization. If cause and cure lie not outside but within the self, then such "illnesses" are in some way unconsciously engineered (not consciously as in malingering) by the patients themselves. Hence, we are led to ask why hysterics (and we are all hysterical at times and to varying degrees) feel the need to bring pain and suffering upon themselves in these ways. There is no doubt that, as Freud would say, such phenomena are "overdetermined," but among their multiple causes (such as the need to suffer to maintain important ties to internal or external objects) we think the role of aggression, guilt, and the unconscious need for punishment has received insufficient attention. For these concepts are distinctly unpopular among many postmodern intellectuals, including those post-Freudian and post-Kleinian psychoanalysts who have come to conceptualize psychopathology less in terms of intrapsychic conflict than in terms of structural defects and deficits arising from parental failure, and conceptualize therapy less as analysis leading patients to insight and self-mastery than as a reparative provision of allegedly missing psychic structure through processes of internalization and identification with the therapist as a kind of substitute parent (Carveth 1998) .
While it is most likely the case that the hystero-paranoid fugitive from guilt has always been with us, the varieties of contemporary psychoanalysis in which the discourse of guilt and self-punishment is played down are poorly prepared to come to grips with the dynamics that underlie this type of suffering. In other words, a psychoanalysis that is itself in flight from guilt is in no position to understand the hystero-paranoid fugitive from guilt, for to do so it would have to understand and cure itself. Needless to say, it is the aim of this paper to contribute to such curative self-understanding.
Of what are arguably the three most important recent books on hysteria-Elaine Showalter's Hystories: Hysterical Epidemics and Modern Media (1997) ; Christopher Bollas's Hysteria (2000) , and Juliet Mitchell's Mad Men and Medusas: Reclaiming Hysteria (2000)-Bollas's work is notable for its singleminded, early-Freudian emphasis on sexuality and its relative neglect of the role of aggression in hysterical conditions. Freud himself never revisited his work on hysteria in light of his later positing of Thanatos (and its outward manifestation as an aggressive drive) as the "immortal adversary" of Eros in a human nature driven by these two "Heavenly Powers" (1930, 145) .
5 For Bollas, as for Freud, "the heart of the matter" of hysteria is "the hysteric's disaffection with his or her sexual life" (2000, 12) .
Bollas argues, we think correctly, that "hysteria has disappeared from contemporary culture only insofar as it has been subjected to a repression through the popular diagnosis of 'borderline personality disorder'" (frontispiece): "thinking the hysteric through the theoretical lenses of the borderline personality had become something of a tragedy" (2). He sets out to recover and elaborate on an earlier psychoanalytic understanding of hysteria. But in so doing he loses sight of the elements of this condition that were at least brought into focus through the theoretical lens of the borderline concept, whatever its inadequacies in other respects-namely, the paranoidschizoid dynamics of splitting, projection, sadomasochism, disavowed aggression and hostility, and the resulting unconscious need for punishment.
Bollas praises Showalter's work and endorses her view that "hysteria is alive and well in the form of attention-deficit disorder [actually not addressed by Showalter 6 ], chronic-fatigue disorder, alien-abduction movements and the like" (2000, 178) , as well as her emphasis on the role of both clinicians and the media in creating such conditions. "It is more than sad," he writes, "that the hysteric's capacity to fulfill the other's desire has meant that many people have dedicated their lives to romances with clinicians, presenting new 'sexy' diagnosessuch as multiple personality disorder-which inevitably earn accolades for the clinicians founding a new term or refounding an old one, now rendered dramatically potent" (178). (Recall in this connection Frederick Wolfe's regret at having pioneered the "fibromyalgia syndrome" diagnosis.) But whereas Showalter does not shrink from the evidence of the dynamics of hatred and paranoid projection in the new hysterias, Bollas writes almost exclusively within a pre-1920 Freudianism that, however enriched by later object relational and Lacanian perspectives and insights, focuses in a one-sided fashion on sexuality. He summarizes his theory of hysteria as follows: "The hysteric specifies the body as the agent of his or her demise because its bio-logic brings sexual mental contents to mind" (178). If the hysteric has been repressed in recent decades by the borderline, in Bollas the borderline (schizoparanoid) is repressed by an old-fashioned view of the hysteric.
In contrast, like Showalter, Juliet Mitchell draws attention to the dynamics of aggression in hysterical conditions. She does so by refocusing our attention on two sets of facts that, although recognized by Freud, were later played down both in his own work and in that of his followers. The first is Charcot's and Freud's early recognition of the existence of male hysteria. Mitchell cites two main reasons for the circumstance that while "the critical claim that inaugurated psychoanalysis was that men could be hysterical . . . psychoanalysis too slipped from explaining to endorsing its proclivity in women" (2000, x) . First, there is "the non-elaboration of the hypothesis of a death drive in general, but in particular in relation to hysteria." (Here, by "death drive" we understand Mitchell to be referring to aggression, violence, and hostility.) She writes: "as with feminists' accounts of hysteria, what is missing [in psychoanalytic accounts such as Bollas's] is that there is violence as well as sexuality in the seductions and rages of the hysteric" (x). The feminization of hysteria extended sexist blindness to female aggression to the hysteric. In addition, the failure to revise the psychoanalytic theory of hysteria in light of the dual-drive theory introduced by Freud in 1920, long after his pioneering work on this condition at the turn of the century, contributed to ignoring the role of aggression, whether conceptualized as primary or secondary to frustration, in hysterical conditions.
The second set of initially recognized but subsequently minimized facts concerns "the omission of the key role played in the construction of the psyche by lateral relationships" (x), that is, by sibling rivalry in personality formation. Mitchell writes, "When a sibling is in the offing, the danger is that the hero-'His Majesty the Baby'-will be annihilated, for this is someone who stands in the same position to parents (and their substitutes) as himself. This possible displacement triggers the wish to kill in the interest of survival" (xi). In the sibling rivalry that inevitably accompanies sibling love, "murder is in the air" (20). Mitchell acknowledges, of course, that such violence may take a sexual form-"to get the interests of all and everyone for oneself" (xi). In connection with the link between violence and hysterical hyper-and pseudo-sexuality, we are reminded of a remark made by a seasoned male clinician in an initial interview with an overtly seductive, scantily clad hysterical young woman: "Why are you trying to destroy me?" Just as Carol's stepson Rory is not blind to the manipulation and passiveaggressiveness beneath his stepmother's manifest helplessness, this older clinician was alert to the destructiveness in seduction.
Like Bollas and Showalter, Mitchell affirms the continuing presence of hysteria in our culture, despite psychiatric attempts to deny it. "It has been fashionable in the twentiethcentury West to argue that hysteria has disappeared. To my mind, this is nonsensical-it is like saying 'love' or 'hate' have vanished. There can be no question that hysteria exists, whether we call its various manifestations by that name or something else" (2000, 6). For Mitchell, there is nothing intrinsically feminine about hysteria, which she views, like love and hate, as a potential of human nature as such, arguing instead that "hysteria has been feminized: over and over again, a universal potential condition has been assigned to the feminine; equally, it has disappeared as a condition after the irrefutable observation that men appeared to display its characteristics" (7).
Like Showalter and Krohn, Mitchell emphasizes hysteria's adaptation to the sociocultural surround: "Hysteria migrates.
Supremely mimetic, what was once called hysteria manifests itself in forms more attuned to its new social surroundings. What was once a subsidiary characteristic becomes dominant and vice versa" (ix). Nevertheless, "hysteria's many manifestations have shown some striking similarities throughout the ages-sensations of suffocation, choking, breathing and eating difficulties, mimetic imitations, deceitfulness, shock, fits, death states, wanting (craving, longing). . . . If the treatments and conceptualizations vary, mimetic hysteria will look different at different times because it is imitating different treatments and different ideas about hysteria" (13).
replace "hysteria," Mitchell comments that "the irony of this triumph of the diagnostic is that the doctors who no longer recognize hysteria's existence continue to refer to it daily." She continues: "given the history of hysteria, one must surely ask: Is it hysteria itself or its classification-psychiatric, medical or psychoanalytic-that has become redundant?" (2000, 15). 8 * * * Many of the varieties of hysteria that Showalter describes exhibit an important trait that she touches on only brieflyparanoia. As she acknowledges in describing the particular vulnerability of American culture to hysterical movements, "such movements have centered on the Masons, Catholicism, communism, the Kennedy assassination, and the fluoridation of water. In the 1990's, hysteria merges with a seething mix of paranoia, anxiety, and anger that comes out of the American crucible" (1997, 26) . She quotes Michael Kelly, who in The New Yorker gives the term "fusion paranoia" to the mélange of conspiracy theories flourishing in the United States: "In its extreme form, paranoia is still the province of minority movements, but the ethos of minority movements-anti-establishmentarian protest, the politics of rage-has become so deeply ingrained in the larger political culture that the paranoid style has become the cohering idea of a broad coalition plurality that draws adherents from every point on the political spectrum" (Showalter 1997 , 26, citing Kelly 1995 . Showalter observes that this "fusion paranoia" has taken up residence in medicine and psychiatry, allowing for the proliferation of conspiracy theories to explain "every unidentified symptom and syndrome" (26-27). This point is elaborated by Sherrill Mulhern, an American anthropologist critical of such recent excesses, who highlights "the emergence of conspiracy theory as the nucleus of a consistent pattern of clinical interpretation. In the United States during the past decade, the clinical milieu has become the vortex of a growing, socially operant conspiratorial mentality, which is undermining crucial sectors of the mental health, criminal justice, and judicial systems" (Showalter 1997 , 27, citing Mulhern 1994 .
The close connection between hysteria and paranoiaand even, perhaps, their interdependence-does not appear to have been explicated by psychoanalytic writers, who have tended, implicitly at least, to treat these conditions as discrete entities. It is to rectify this insufficiently theorized linkage that we refer to the psychological conditions we are addressing as hystero-paranoid. Consistent with the tendency of psychoanalytic writers to treat hysteria and paranoia as unrelated, Melanie Klein wrote extensively about anxiety and paranoia, but was "silent on the subject of hysteria" (Rycroft 1968, 64) . However, certain insights into the origins of hysteria can be extrapolated from her writings. We contend that there is a relation between hysteria and Klein's paranoid-schizoid position, so much so that hysteria may be viewed as an offshoot of the latter that almost inevitably produces hysteric symptoms, albeit often minor ones that often go unrecognized.
Human beings are never free from the task of managing their primal passions, fantasies, and anxieties, including their aggression, or from the simultaneous need to order and regulate the world of internal objects and form meaningful connections with external ones. Because these tasks of mental life are ongoing and permanent rather than occurring in discrete stages, the mental "positions" Klein expounded are fluid, dynamic states that are present in varying degrees throughout every phase of life. The infant's early preambivalent paranoid-schizoid state, characterized by splitting of the object (and the self) into all-good and all-bad part-objects (and partselves), persecutory anxiety, envy, manic defenses, "symbolic equations" (Segal 1957 ) and "beta elements" (Bion 1962) , optimally gives way to the depressive position's ambivalence, whole object (and self) relating, guilt, reparation, gratitude, capacity for "symbolic representation," "alpha function" and creativity. But elements of paranoid-schizoid functioning, both healthy and pathological, remain operative in all persons throughout life. In current post-Kleinian theory, development is no longer conceived as a unilinear progression from paranoid-schizoid to depressive, but dialectically, with pathology being conceptualized as breakdown of the dialectic into a fixation on either pole (Ogden 1986) .
At this date in the development of object relations theory, it is unnecessary to adhere to a literal notion of a biologically grounded aggressive drive, let alone any literal death instinct, in order to credit Klein's insight into the fact that, even with the most attuned and devoted caretakers imaginable, all infants must encounter some degree of frustration that inevitably generates aggression that, when projected, returns in the form of persecutory anxiety. It is plausible to assume that the cognitively immature infant experiences any frustration as an attack, and any absence of "good" as an indication of the malevolent presence of "bad." It follows that the infant assumes it to be the job of the good part-object to protect and gratify, while experiencing any pain and frustration not merely as an indication that the good part-object is failing at this task, but that it has actually turned into a bad part-object-i.e., a persecutor. Needless to say, any "surplus" frustration, beyond the unavoidable existential minimum, arising from objective environmental failure of various types, will only aggravate a paranoid dynamic that is in varying degrees universal.
In the face of frustration and feelings of persecution, the infant reacts with both fear and aggression that are themselves frightening and that, when projected, only add to its persecutory anxiety. Here, in the realm of disowned aggression, lies the particular insight of Kleinian theory into the development of hysterical illness. The subject operating in the paranoidschizoid position cannot escape the feeling of attack, having repudiated its own aggressive and destructive impulses and situated them squarely in the outside world. This move, however, fails to dissolve the aggression. It still exists in all its strength on the outside, which is now rendered threatening and dangerous. The ensuing tangle of conflict is compounded when the subject also projects perceived good objects and impulses in order to protect them from the contamination of badness inside, and introjects or even identifies with perceived external persecutors in an attempt to gain control of them. Segal comments that "in situations of anxiety the split is widened and projection and introjection are used in order to keep persecutory and ideal objects as far as possible from one another, while keeping both under control. The situation may fluctuate rapidly, and persecutors may be felt now outside, giving a feeling of external threat, now inside, producing fears of a hypochondriacal nature" (1964, (26) (27) . Hysteria may likewise be interpreted as the product of a paranoid-schizoid dynamic in which individuals who have split off and disowned their own aggressive and destructive impulses suffer from fantasies of attack and an abiding sense of being made ill by hostile forces, either within the body (as in "fibromyalgia syndrome" and "chronic fatigue syndrome") or outside it in the environment (as in "environmental illness" or "multiple chemical sensitivity"), but in any case from outside the self.
We have described the tendency of hysterical patients to regard their symptoms as residing in the body but not of the self, that is, existing as a foreign, invading force. In paranoidschizoid functioning, the subject may disown or evacuate his internal bad self and objects, project the split-off contents, and, as a consequence, perceive the external world as independently bad and dangerous. To complicate matters further, in an attempt to manage the external persecutors thus created, he may reintroject them. Segal's observation regarding the introjection of persecutors and subsequent hypochondria (in which the persecutors are felt to be attacking from within the body) illustrates the conjunction between paranoia and hysteria.
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According to Segal, "the projection of bad feelings and bad parts of the self outwards produces external persecution. The reintrojection of persecutors gives rise to hypochondriacal anxiety" (1964, 30) . While there are grounds for maintaining the distinction between hypochondria and hysteria, and for viewing the former as one type or manifestation of the latter, it is reasonable to extrapolate a reciprocal connection between paranoia and hysteria by way of this connection between paranoia and hypochondriacal anxiety. Both involve projection and a resulting experience of attack and persecution, in one case from without, in the other from within. But the psychoanalytic literature has tended to treat paranoia and hysteria as discrete conditions, and these citations from Segal may be one of the few places where paranoia and hypochondria are explicitly brought together with hysteria.
The splitting characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position produces an austere, one-dimensional, concrete mode of thinking and an inability to relate to others as whole persons. In Klein's words, "where the persecution anxiety for the ego is in the ascendant, a full and stable identification with another object, in the sense of looking at it and understanding it as it really is, and a full capacity for love, are not possible" (1934, 291) . Conceiving of the world in terms of part-objects and keeping good and bad thoroughly separated allows the subject to feel as though he is protecting good objects from contamination by the badness inside him. But paranoid-schizoid functioning exacts a high price for the manufacture of this apparent "safe" zone through projection of the badness, if not in the form of persecutory fantasies, feelings, and outright paranoid delusions, then in the hysterical (and psychosomatic) disorders that embody the return of the disavowed badness and simultaneously punish the subject in ways that evade the experience of unbearable guilt.
A central feature of the paranoid-schizoid position is an inability to achieve the types of guilt and remorse that are operative in the depressive position (Meissner 1978, 13) and that reflect attainment of what Winnicott (1963) called "the capacity for concern." Instead of such mature "depressive guilt" (Grinberg 1964 ), what we find in paranoid-schizoid functioning is either an intensely self-attacking "persecutory guilt" that is entirely narcissistic and reflects little or no concern for the object (and therefore, as we have argued above, should not be described as guilt at all) or else a variety of tormenting states (including hysterical and psychosomatic conditions) that operate as substitutes for and defenses against unattainable or unbearable depressive guilt. In the context of the depressive position, a continual state of rage and feelings of destructiveness will be accompanied by simultaneous feelings of conscious guilt, concern, and the need to make reparation. In the paranoid-schizoid position, however, such destructiveness is split off and projected, resulting in persecutory anxiety and unconscious masochistic needs for expiation through self-punishment (Reisenberg-Malcolm 1980) . Desy Safán-Gerard (1998) describes a patient whose career has collapsed after he leaves his wife and children to pursue one of his numerous affairs. At the end of one session the patient ponders, "I don't know what changed after my separation.
Because I used to make good money before. Did I change or did reality change?" (365). This patient's enormous load of unbearable guilt, which he verbally acknowledges but evades in reality since he cannot allow himself to feel or suffer from it, must nevertheless be expiated in some way. In this light, the collapse of his career and his financial difficulties, events that seem to be "just happening" to him, may be viewed as a form of self-sabotage.
As previously noted, we adhere to the theory that the unconscious need for self-punishment is not, contrary to Freud's view, a manifestation of unconscious guilt. The unconscious need for self-punishment serves rather to defend against the experience of unbearable conscious guilt. We believe it to be expressed in a wide range of psychopathological conditions, including hysterical and psychosomatic disorders. But just as the hysterical or somatizing subject takes flight from unbearable guilt into self-tormenting symptoms, so a demoralizing post-Freudian psychiatry and psychoanalysis repress the dynamics of the superego-that is, of the soul-in favor of one or another form of reductionism in which the meaningful communications of the psyche (soul) are reduced to byproducts of neurochemical malfunction or the results of trauma and deprivation. Even when patients are viewed as victims of bad parenting, a de-moralizing psychoanalysis seeks to protect such parents from guilt and responsibility by viewing them, in turn, as victims. The irony is that even when both patients and psychiatrists, analysands and analysts, tacitly agree to repress the discourse of sin and guilt, the unconscious superego is alive and well in both groups: it torments the patients for their evasion of conscious guilt; and it finds expression in the psychiatrists and psychoanalysts who attack the supposed abusers of their patient-victims, including those who would see them as hysterical.
* * *
When self-defeating and self-destructive patterns and symptoms are observed in patients, they are almost always manifestations of an inability or unwillingness to acknowledge guilt.
We do not refer to guilt in the analyst's opinion. Although the making of moral judgments is an inevitable aspect of the countertransference, this should be contained and understood, not acted-out. We mean guilt as estimated by the patient's, not the analyst's, superego.
When a person acknowledges the voice of the superego, becomes conscious of the painful sense of responsibility, the stab of conscience, that the superego has caused one to experience, he can understand his wishes and impulses, apologize, make reparation, and become strong, not sick. We believe that most people can realistically promise to live in a way that doesn't repeat what their superego judges to be destructive, once they recognize the introjects and injunctions of their superego. At the point of conscious awareness and apology, one can let go of self-torment (sickness) and move on.
When the badness (as judged by the patient's superego) involves fantasies and wishes, the uncontrollable creations of the id, rather than actual inappropriate behaviors, the only promise one can make is to understand the distinction between wishing and acting. The more the corrupt wish is allowed conscious expression, the less chance there is that the person will need to act it out. When any evil impulse or wish is made conscious and verbalized rather than allowed to remain unconscious and acted upon, the ego is strengthened and symptoms as compromise-formations become unnecessary. On the other hand, when a patient represses her superego's judgement that she's done or wished something immoral, she becomes symptomatic and perhaps also destructive, suicidal or homicidal, emotionally or literally. The analyst's task is then to examine the patient's symptoms to understand what the superego is pressing him or her to acknowledge and resolve.
Unfortunately, the well-intentioned desire on the part of many psychoanalysts to avoid being linked to either the world of the lawyer or the world of the priest has led to a neglect of the superego's clamor for conscious (verbal) recognition-i.e., for naming, describing, acknowledging, and tempering. Analysts' aversion to being the superego for their patients has frequently led, in both clinical practice and theoretical writing, to a reluctance to examine superego functioning at all. It may also happen that a countertransferential inability to tolerate the painful revelation of a patient's badness-badness as judged primarily by the patient's superego, but sometimes also by the analyst's-unconsciously causes analysts to steer clear of the topic.
Analysts aren't required to judge whether or not a patient should feel guilty about his wishes or actions. In fact, it works against the aim of making unconscious conscious for an analyst to weigh in with her values and opinions about what is right and wrong over the course of a patient's treatment. For various reasons, many psychoanalysts feel that soothing a patient's superego is part of their job. It is not uncommon for an analyst to communicate to a patient that he or she has nothing to feel guilty about-for example in the case of murderous oedipal fantasies that are, as we know, part of the human condition. But even in the case of real-life actions, such as ignoring mother on Mother's Day, psychoanalysts have been known to attempt to absolve the patient, communicating in some way that there is nothing to feel guilty about.
Setting aside for a moment the fact that, according to the patient's superego, there is indeed quite a lot to feel guilty about-guilt that must be reckoned with, not avoided-the act of soothing a patient's superego voice implies that the analyst has taken a stand in regard to value judgments and has brought her own set of moral criteria into the session. In contradictory fashion, these analysts come down hard on colleagues who recognize that the patient's superego's judgments (e.g., "you should feel guilty") represent an important aspect of the latter's personality and must necessarily occupy an essential and valid place in the analysis.
In examining a patient's superego functioning, we contend that analysts should strive as far as possible to maintain the classical stance of technical neutrality that, according to Anna Freud (1936) , involves taking up a position "equidistant from the id, the ego, and the superego" (28). Admittedly, perfection is unattainable and, for this reason, we should seek to be as conscious as possible of our moral biases as significant aspects of the countertransference.
Departures from the stance of technical neutrality can take the form of either inappropriate moral soothing or inappropriate moral condemnation. It is our impression that the former departures seem more acceptable in today's climate than the latter. Soothing gives the patient the message that his or her badness should probably be concealed from an analyst who thinks everything is okay, or who just cannot tolerate intense feelings of remorse. The patient hides his feelings of badness. This type of analyst will aid the patient in further symptom-forming self-punitiveness, rather than helping to bring his unconscious moral conflicts to consciousness where they might be resolved.
Condemning gives the patient the message that she is in the presence of a priestly confessor-not an analyst-who will, ironically, inadvertently foster additional symptom-forming self-punitiveness instead of conducting an analysis. The patient hides her feelings of badness.
It is notable that almost all unanalyzed people display, to some degree at least, the modern hysterical dynamic of a murderous wish, leading to guilt denied, leading in turn to an inhibited or symptomatic life. We have rarely encountered patients who haven't been affected in some way by being taught to silence both their rage and their remorse, with the consequence that they spend their lives engaged in hysterical and destructive behavior.
Case 2: Mr. B
A man who began analysis at age forty-five has had bodily preoccupations since childhood. He is compelled to stare into mirrors to "see if I'm here." He somatizes with various illnesses (such as Graves disease) whenever he hates. That is, he has developed unconsciously a systematic somatic defense against the feeling of hate. Before he consciously realizes that something or someone has stimulated his rage, Mr. B will have a fever, heart palpitations, or diagnosable thyroid alterations. Along with illnesses Mr. B has had elective surgeries for various ailments leading to vague postoperative medical regimens and prescriptions. He reports that his wife (whom he would like to avoid touching) is annoyed at night when he lines up his multitude of pill bottles, then swallows his medications in a ritual that drives her to fall asleep before they can be intimate.
Born the fourth of eight children to a cold, inattentive, phobic, and distracted mother, Mr. B has only two pleasant memories of childhood. The first is that at age five he contracted an illness that was serious enough for him to miss two months of school but did not warrant hospitalization. A bed was placed in the living room so his mother could take care of him without having to run upstairs. That time of being ill, which he was told damaged his heart slightly but permanently, was the only time in his life that he had his mother to himself. Mr. B's only other nice memory of his mother occurred when his baby brother was born. His brother, the last of the eight children, made the mother happier than the others for no apparent reason. Mr. B sensed his mother's unusual calm (she was usually depressed and cold) and he was allowed to sit beside her as she fed his brother. Mr. B feels an inextricable link between disease and attachment. He experiences both horror and excitement at signs of illness, as his childhood illness was the only time he had a mother.
A year after the birth of Mr. B, his sister C, the fifth child, was born. This sister is the now consciously identified root of Mr. B's history of denied hate, sneaky sadism, guilt-evasion, and psychosomatic illness. For the first half of his analysis, he could recall torturing C in many ways but did not know why. The motivation was a total mystery. He could remember coldly pushing C off the bed, demeaning her, abandoning her on the busy city street when he was six and C was five, but all with no conscious recollection of the accompanying feelings. Why would someone push his sister off the bed? Mr. B couldn't answer. (Long pause). "I'm truly puzzled . . . we all loved each other so much." He was entirely unaware of any feelings of rivalry, hate, frustration, craving, or envy. He could access only memories of having felt sorry for C for never being as popular as he was and for developing debilitating anxieties and not being able to go to college, while he went on to receive a master's degree. As is typical of this dynamic, when murderous impulses are acted on with repression of affect, responsibility and subsequent contrition can be evaded. Then the stillunconscious aggression is turned against the self that continues to deny having acted criminally. The patient enacts the parts of both the criminal and the sentencing judge and jury.
In Mr. B's case, however, even his self-torment has always been tinged with an excitement that can only be described as sexual, though such excitement is a physical consequence, not the aim of the violence. In the sequence of denied rage, sadistic action, and evasion of responsibility, he is quite overtaken physically. His heart flutters and pounds as his thyroid "kicks up." He gets flushed and breathes heavily. He sweats and smiles weakly as his eyes roll back and his lashes flutter. During this theatrical demonstration of falling ill, Mr. B maintains a cheerful demeanor, impeccable grooming, and meticulous orderliness. His analytic group has been perplexed watching the discrepancy between Mr. B's alarming medical symptoms, his thrill at being swept away by them, and his determination to be perceived as cheerful and impeccable all at the same time. Psychoanalysts know how hard it is to be an hysteric. It is one of the most exhausting and often permanently debilitating defenses against rage that we treat.
In summary, what leads to his somatization? Denied hate. He hates and is unconscious of his homicidal rage towards the person he hates. Someone has been disrespectful; someone threatened to leave him; someone turned down an invitation. Mr. B denies to himself that he'd love to knock these offending people right off the bed. He no longer overtly pushes anyone.
He gets sick instead of consciously feeling and talking.
By working together for seven years, along with help from his analytic group, Mr. B and the analyst have gradually been able to make conscious the dark rage that underlies his pose of "nothing's wrong," his sneaky aggressive actions, the evasion of responsibility, and subsequent self-punishments via illnesses. Where it used to take Mr. B a year of analysis to acknowledge the progression from rage to illness, he now identifies it quickly. In fact, he is now beginning to interrupt the hysterical sequence by substituting feelings and words for symptoms, that is, he is becoming healthy by becoming real.
Conclusions
With Showalter, Shorter, Bollas, Mitchell, and others, we believe that hysteria has not disappeared but been trans-formed, nowadays taking the form of environmental illness (EI), multiple chemical sensitivity (MCS), chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS), multiple personality disorder (MPD), fibromyalgia syndrome (FMS), alien abduction syndrome (AA), Gulf War syndrome (GWS), intestinal toxins and parasitic infestation syndrome (ITPIS), and, in proxy form, attention deficit disorder (ADD) and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), among other syndromes-e.g., the hysteria around video display terminals (VDTS); Mad Cow Disease (MCDS); the millennial hysteria (Y2KS); the mass hysteria around asbestos or molds-and the list goes on.
Because Freud never revised his sex-centered theory of hysteria after he introduced the death drive in 1920, the role of aggression in this condition has not been adequately recognized. As late as 2000, Bollas still viewed hysteria in largely sexual terms. On the other hand, the Kleinians, who emphasize the role of aggression in psychopathology, have had little to say about hysteria, except for their understanding that hypochondria, a subtype of hysteria, involves a paranoid sense of persecution by bad objects imagined to reside inside as opposed to outside of the body. But the Kleinians have failed to develop the connection between hysteria and the paranoidschizoid position-a connection so profound that we regard the various forms of hysteria as subtypes of a more general hystero-paranoid syndrome.
In our view, both the old and the new hysterias involve a paranoid-schizoid retreat from and defense against the depressive position-i.e., a retreat from Winnicott's "capacity for concern" into a narcissistic and schizoid nonrelatedness, combined with repression and projection of destructive hatred and envy of the object, resulting in a paranoid state of persecution by the bad objects into which the subject's hate has been projected. The resulting paranoid torment serves the archaic superego's demand for punishment for both the schizoid coldness toward and hatred of the object world.
Such self-torment has been called "persecutory guilt" as distinct from "depressive guilt" by Leon Grinberg (1964) , but we (Carveth 2001) have argued that it is misleading to refer to such disparate phenomena as paranoid self-torment and concern for the object as "guilt"-especially since the former serves as a defense against the latter on the part of those unable to bear the guilt, concern, and drive toward reparation characteristic of the depressive position.
Carol "White"-a personality purged by externalization of all darkness-suffers from a schizoid state of demoralization resulting from her de-moralizing flight from concern and guilt-i.e., from human relatedness-and from a paranoid state of persecution resulting from projection or externalization of her hostility, a state of torment that simultaneously defends against unbearable guilt and punishes her for her evasion, irresponsibility, and hatred.
Carol's personal demoralization, and the de-moralizing flight from morality-i.e., object relations-that causes it, mirrors that of the wider culture. We live in a society in which we can say we disagree with someone, but can no longer say that he or she is wrong, let alone that he or she is bad. From the politician to the intellectual, we are all aided in avoiding contrition, remorse, responsibility, and the need to make reparation. Our cultural mantra is Carol's: "I can't help it."
We are in no way claiming that people were morally better in the past when the Judeo-Christian discourse of sin and responsibility was still in force. In fact, owing to that very discourse (among other factors) the brutality of the Middle Ages has been significantly transcended in liberal democratic societies. It is thanks to such moral progress (insofar as actions as distinct from wishes and feelings are concerned), such a strengthening of superego demands, that it has become more difficult for us to bear the discontents of civilized life-that is, the guilt feelings arising from our brutal impulses that must either be evaded through the patterns of unconscious selftorment or endured and, if possible, creatively transformed.
One thing is clear: the de-moralizing trend evidenced in the demoralization and unconscious self-torment seen in the new hysterias is mirrored by the de-moralizing trend and the demoralization of contemporary psychoanalysis. For unlike its Freudian and Kleinian forbears, various popular schools of post-Freudian psychoanalysis all too often retreat from helping patients discover their agency and assume responsibility for their suffering and instead collude with the cultural discourse of victimhood in which persons are held to be products of their traumatic childhoods, parental failures, poorly calibrated neurochemistry, or whatever. Although such therapists are not blaming a polluted environment but toxic neurotransmitters, not alien abduction but the absent father or unempathic mother, they share the defensive externalization of responsibility with their hysterical patients. Furthermore, should these mothers and fathers ever find themselves in analysis, they too are helped to understand themselves as victims.
What then is the direction forward? Certainly it is neither the path of an instinctual liberation that would seek to return us to a premoral era nor the path of brutal interpretations of guilt. It is not necessary for analysts to be sadistic in interpreting guilt to help people confront it. But neither is it the continuation of our current de-moralizing trends that merely intensify the unconscious need for punishment. What is called for is neither the de-moralizing nor the re-moralizing of psychoanalysis, but rather the analyzing of unconscious superego dynamics, so that patients may be aided in transforming their unconscious self-torment into conscious guilt and thereby enabled to find ways to bear it, to make creative reparation, and to change.
Glendon We place the word "guilt" in inverted commas here to indicate our belief that the "persecutory guilt" contrasted by Grinberg (1964) with "depressive guilt" is not really guilt at all: it is persecutory anxiety. The term "guilt" should be reserved, in our view, for "depressive guilt" or what Winnicott (1963) termed "the capacity for concern." As Alexander (1925; 1930; 1961) was among the first to recognize, true guilt (in what Klein called the depressive position) is an ego function: it involves thinking about the consequences of our behavior for others. In this way it contrasts with the essentially narcissistic nature of the "persecutory anxiety" that entails a superego attack on the self notable for its lack of concern for the injured other. It is the paranoid-schizoid and narcissistic nature of the superego that enabled Alexander to define the aim of the analytic cure as its elimination. 2. Some three decades ago, Menninger (1973) asked Whatever Became of Sin? We have heard psychoanalytic colleagues, not Freudians or Kleinians but self psychologists and some relational analysts, report that they seldom if ever encounter guilt or the unconscious need for punishment as significant dynamics in the lives of their patients. A technique of empathic attunement to patients' conscious and preconscious experience that views their unconscious experience as no more than the analyst's imposition of his theories might be expected to ignore these dynamics. 3. In keeping with Freud's acknowledgement that the "choice of neurosis" is often beyond the powers of psychoanalysis to explain, so the development of one subtype of the hystero-paranoid syndrome as distinct from another may not be fully accountable in particular cases. 4. Some recent evidence has appeared that calls into question the hysteroparanoid basis of at least some cases of so-called Gulf War syndrome. Like Showalter, we have no reluctance to acknowledge an organic basis for conditions such as MCS, EI, or FMS, if and when consensually validated scientific evidence in support of such claims leads to their medical recognition as diseases. 5. In emphasizing the role of aggression in psychopathology we imply no commitment to either the notion of a death instinct or a somatically grounded aggressive drive. We merely recognize the fact that frustration (an unavoidable feature of human existence) leads to aggression that then must be directed outwardly (in constructive or destructive ways) or bottled up and retroflected against the self. 6. We would argue that in the case of so-called attention-deficit disorder the hysteric is less the child so diagnosed than the parents, teachers, psychologists, and school officials who redefine boredom, dreaminess, fidgetiness, and passive aggressiveness as an organically based disorder absent any evidence of the "minimal brain dysfunction" (or whatever) that is alleged to underlie it. 7. Such difficulties are well depicted in the case of Carol White in Safe, a film that ought to be required study for physicians and psychotherapists working with hysteria. 8. The same might well be said for the classification "psychosomatic illness," which many doctors now no longer officially recognize, but continue to refer to daily. 9. This dynamic is shown to be at work in a Kleinian analysis of the film Alien (Gabbard and Gabbard, 1987) and discussed further in Carveth and Gold (1999) . There is an unforgettable scene in which, thinking they had successfully eliminated the alien creature that had plastered itself like a bad breast over the mouth of one member, the crew are enjoying a celebratory meal when the alien stirs and begins to move inside him and then suddenly smashes its way through his chest and scuttles off into the interior of the ship.
